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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents an assessment of the performance of the Kickstart and 
Bus Route Development Grant schemes in England and Scotland which 
aimed to move marginal or new bus services towards commercial operation.  
Three key aspects are addressed: the bidding and implementation process; 
performance against objectives and the future potential of the approach.  The 
evidence suggests that this form of transformational support appears to offer 
a better return than subsidy that supports the status quo or indeed patronage 
based support. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Government support to the bus industry in Britain has risen in recent years 
and in real terms has now reached pre-deregulation levels.  Over the past ten 
years in England (outside London) both bus patronage and bus kilometres 
have fallen. The 2006/7 increase of 2.7% in bus journeys in England (outside 
London) was largely attributed to the introduction in April 2006 of free off peak 
local bus travel for everyone aged over 60 and disabled people (Department 
for Transport, 2007a). It does not therefore necessarily reflect a reversal of 
trend in the overall bus market. The withdrawal of commercial services has 
been partially offset by increases in supported services resulting in an overall 
decline in bus kilometres (Department for Transport, 2006a).  
 
The Kickstart Scheme, introduced in England in 2003, and the Bus Route 
Development Grant (BRDG) Scheme, introduced in Scotland in 2005, 
attempted to address these long term problems of decline and increasing 
subsidy by aiming to improve both patronage and the viability of services.   
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The programmes award grants of up to three years through a competitive 
bidding process, to support the provision of new or enhanced bus services 
often in “marginal” operating territory.  By the end of the funding period 
supported services are expected to achieve financial sustainability and ideally 
to become commercially viable through patronage growth. Experience with 
this type of targeted approach is limited to examples in New Zealand, an 
experimental service in Perth, Scotland where the approach yielded high rates 
of patronage growth (Wallis, 2005, Souter et al, 2004) and in Bristol where 17 
services were moved to commercial operation (Bentley and Lynch, 2001). 
 
This paper is based on an assessment of the performance of the Kickstart 
and BRDG schemes undertaken for the Department for Transport and the 
Scottish Executive in 2006 (Bristow et al, 2007).  Three key aspects are 
included: 
 
• An assessment of the bidding and implementation processes based on 
an extensive stakeholder consultation exercise with bus operators and 
Local Authorities covering all those holding grants and a number of 
unsuccessful bidders and non-bidders.   
• An examination of the performance of the supported services against 
objectives using operational data gathered for the project from 
stakeholders.   
• Consideration of the future potential of such schemes within the current 
organisational structure in Britain and the provision of 
recommendations for the future.  
 
To this end section 2 outlines the schemes and section 3 the research 
approach.  Section 4 addresses the process and implementation, section 5 
scheme impacts, section 6 policy implications and the conclusions are located 
in section 7. 
 
2. THE SCHEMES 
 
Kickstart began life in England in 2003 as part of the Urban and Rural Bus 
Challenge Schemes. The objectives were to increase bus patronage and 
develop bus services as an alternative to car use, with an additional aim of 
achieving commercial viability by the end of the Kickstart funding period 
(Department for Transport, 2003a and 2003b). Kickstart has since been 
expanded with amended objectives and has superseded the Challenge 
schemes. The latest Kickstart funding round in 2005 placed commercial 
viability at the heart of the initiative. 
 
“projects which have a clear prospect of becoming commercially viable, or 
otherwise fully self-sustaining with a guarantee of local authority subsidy or 
other sources of funding, after a finite period of Kickstart support” (Department 
for Transport, 2005a).  
 
The Bus Route Development Grant (BRDG) scheme administered by the 
Scottish Executive operates on similar principles to Kickstart. The general 
purpose of the grant is to “improve access to public transport, encourage 
modal shift and reduce congestion” (Scottish Executive, 2006a). As with 
Kickstart there is an emphasis on projects that can achieve commercial 
viability but this is not prescriptive in that  
 
“subsidised services and subsidised elements of services will also be 
considered for funding where growth can be demonstrated or where other 
benefits such as improved accessibility or bus networks can be achieved, and 
where the transport authority agrees to maintain the existing level of subsidy 
during the specified period of service or until commercial viability is achieved.” 
(Scottish Executive, 2006a).   
 
Both Kickstart and BRDG provide support for up to three years. The first 
round of Kickstart schemes in 2003 saw funding amounting to £7.83 million 
awarded to 18 pilot schemes. A further 43 schemes were allocated funding of 
£20 million in the second round in 2005. The initial 27 BRDG awards totalling 
£12.2 million were made in March 2005 followed by £3.7 million of funding in 
a second round of nine schemes later in 2005. Further awards, beyond the 
timeframe of this study were made in October 2006 of eight schemes totalling 
£7.5 million and four schemes totalling £2.8 million in March 2007. The 
geographical spread of the schemes covered in this paper is shown in Figure 
1 and a list provided in Annex 1. 
 
To place Kickstart and BRDG support in context, the mainstream sources of 
Government support to bus services are: 
 
• The Bus Service Operators Grant (BSOG). This is effectively a rebate 
of 80% of fuel duty paid and amounted to £430 million in 2004/5; 
• Public transport support  of £924 million  in 2004/5 and  
• Concessionary fares reimbursement of £595 million 2004/5. 
 
These sources amount to a total annual support of £1948 million (Department 
for Transport, 2006a). The allocation of BSOG is dependent upon bus 
mileage and concessionary fares payments upon use by elderly and disabled 
people and the reimbursement formula used. It is only the support for public 
transport that is allocated by Local Authorities directly to secure bus service 
provision. It is worth pointing out that of the funds for public transport support 
nearly 60% was spent on buses in London, where 40% of bus journeys take 
place. The amount spent in England outside London was £309 million and in 
Scotland £38 million.  In the same year Kickstart support amounted to £20 
million and BRDG £15.9 million amounting to less than 2% of the total support 
to bus services in that year, but providing a significant boost to the support for 
bus service provision outside London. 
 
2006 offered the earliest opportunity to examine the performance of both the 
services provided in relation to the objectives and of the process by which the 
schemes are administered.  For the 2003 Kickstart awards and to a lesser 
extent for some of the BRDG schemes and 2005 Kickstart awards it was also 
possible to examine the impacts and outputs. 
 
3. APPROACH  
 
The study was undertaken in 2006 and had two key themes: obtaining and 
analysing data on scheme performance and the development and 
implementation of two phases of stakeholder consultation. 
 
The main sources of data available were the Kickstart proposal documents 
and the annual progress reports submitted to the Department for Transport. 
Although some information could be extracted from these sources for both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis, most of these progress reports contained 
little monitoring data.  Additional data was therefore gathered during the 
consultation phase from Local Authorities and bus operators.  Overall data 
availability and quality for the purposes of comparison was limited for a variety 
of reasons including inconsistent baseline data, operator concerns over 
confidentiality and variation in the data sought by the administering authority. 
 
There was a clear difference in philosophy in the reporting requirements 
between the Kickstart and BRDG schemes.  Essentially for Kickstart reports 
“there are no fixed rules” (Department for Transport, 2006b).  Reports were 
expected to contain information on patronage, cost per passenger and 
marketing activities but there were no requirements to provide quantified data 
in a particular form.  The annual reports therefore vary in their content, with 
some being highly descriptive, and do not facilitate comparison between 
schemes. In contrast the Scottish Executive requires a detailed breakdown of 
costs, revenue and patronage on a quarterly basis to be submitted on the 
grant claim form (Scottish Executive, 2006b).  This should provide the 
Scottish Executive with a good base from which to assess performance in 
terms of patronage in the future. As a result of data constraints the 
quantitative analysis reported is limited to an anonymised simple analysis of 
patronage growth and support per passenger and additional passenger.  
 
The stakeholder consultation was designed to:  
 
• Provide insight into the performance of the services and the extent to 
which objectives are met;  
• Obtain information regarding any problems and issues that had arisen 
in service implementation and how these had been addressed by the 
partners;  
• Obtain data on scheme monitoring, where available, for analysis.   
 
Pilot interviews were conducted with representatives of two of the Kickstart 
pilot projects to test the suitability of the topic guide and to assess the average 
amount of time required per interview.  The consultation took place in two 
phases. 
 
Phase 1: face to face interviews with representatives of all 18 of the Kickstart 
pilot projects awarded in 2003.  Separate interviews were conducted with the 
operator and the responsible local authority.  Interviews lasted around 90 
minutes on average. 
 
Phase 2: interviews with representatives of successful 2005 Kickstart and 
BRDG schemes. In addition some unsuccessful bidders and non-bidders 
were interviewed (through the use of a case study area – the East of 
England). 
 
For the second phase the topic guide was amended to concentrate more on 
the processes and issues given that the availability of quantitative data was 
likely to be more limited than for the 2003 Kickstart pilot schemes.  Full details 
of the topic guides, successful bids and organisations interviewed may be 
found in Bristow et al, (2007). 
 
4. PROCESS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
This section contains a brief discussion of issues uncovered in the 
stakeholder analysis on the process and implementation of Kickstart and 
BRDG.  Specifically this covers the bidding process, the implementation 
process, and marketing and market research. A more detailed examination of 
these issues may be found in Bristow et al (2007).  Table 1 summarises key 
points arising from experience of the bidding process and Table 2 from the 
implementation process.  A few key points of interest are elaborated here.  
Firstly, with respect to operator involvement the proposals were Local 
Authority led in conjunction with a preferred operator.  There was no 
competition.  Whilst competition would be viewed as advantageous in 
controlling costs it could be counter productive as a key aspect of Kickstart 
and BRDG is partnership working and in many cases the lifting of existing 
marginal services into commercial viability which requires the cooperation of 
the incumbent.  Secondly, the balance of risk is very much with the operator 
as the level of support is fixed for three years.  They stand to gain if revenue 
exceed expectations or lose if it fails to meet targets.    Smaller operators bear 
a high level of risk. The Local Authority bears no direct financial risk, although 
there may be budget impacts if services require support beyond the grant 
support period. 
 
Table 1: The Bidding Process 
Feature or 
Issue 
Experience 
Originator Local Authorities sought schemes that “best” fit with local 
objectives.  These would not always be the schemes that 
operators felt would be most successful. 
Consultation Local Authorities need to ensure that all operators have the 
opportunity to put forward schemes: this didn’t always happen 
in the 2003 round. 
Bids Prepared by Local Authorities, sometimes using in-house or 
commissioned consultants.  Pro-formas were seen as useful 
but there were still data inconsistencies and some found it 
difficult to make a good case within the constraints imposed. 
Tendering Schemes were developed as a partnership between the Local 
Authority and an operator.  It was never envisaged that 
services would be put out to tender.  Problems arose because 
of doubts on compliance with the 1985 Transport Act, EU 
legislation and competition legislation. 
Timescale Time between announcement and submission date for 
Kickstart was perceived to be too short to allow: 
• Development of cogent, coherent proposal 
• Full consultation with operators 
• Consultation with potential stakeholders 
• Coordination of capital expenditure 
In Scotland there was some confusion over timescales: 
authorities felt the need to rush in case the “pot” was 
exhausted. 
Scheme 
objectives 
Scheme objectives were quite diverse especially for the 2003 
pilot schemes, but fell broadly into the following categories: 
• social inclusion and exclusion,  
• public transport service level,  
• wider policy integration,  
• patronage,  
• modal shift,  
• financial viability / sustainability, and  
• infrastructure. 
 
Table 2 The Implementation Process 
Feature/Issue Experience 
Partnership In many cases genuine partnerships between Local 
Authorities and bus operators have evolved or been 
strengthened. 
Timescales The main causes of delay in implementation were: 
• Vehicle purchase – less of a problem for national 
operators with fleet replacement programmes but 
smaller operators could not place orders until the 
award was confirmed. 
• Infrastructure works by the Local Authority. 
Some operators felt that the levels of commitment to delivery 
required from operators were higher than for Local 
Authorities. 
Risk Clearly greater for smaller operators. 
Local Authorities varied in approach. Some were keen to 
support marginal services aiming to reduce overall support 
budget, others were more risk averse, only supporting 
schemes with very good chance of commercially viability. 
Vehicles Some authorities tried to secure any new vehicles to routes 
beyond the Kickstart contract period. 
Monitoring 
data 
High degree of variability between authorities from requiring 
monthly returns as for a supported service to a hands-off 
commercial service approach. 
State aid The Scottish Executive in seeking to ensure that state aid 
rules are not breached requested data on whole routes 
including parts not covered by BRDG – this has led to 
operator concerns with respect to confidentiality of 
commercial data. 
Clawback Where a BRDG service performs above forecast levels the 
level of support is reduced accordingly.  Although in the 
original written rules, operators felt this wasn’t stated clearly 
enough.  This could also be seen as a penalty for success. 
Clawback does not apply to the Kickstart services. 
Capital 
funding 
Uncertainty as to whether such funding could be applied for 
under this scheme – led to some authorities bidding for and 
getting such support to the surprise of others. 
 
The responsibility for marketing and market research seemed to default to the 
operators, in line with practice in relation to commercial bus services. The 
approach adopted differed between schemes (and operators) interventions 
included: 
 
• Door-to-door leaflet drops to properties along the route of the service 
immediately prior to start of the service / service enhancements.   
• Customised timetable for different parts of a route providing a different 
timetable leaflet showing key residential areas and employment 
locations.   
• Telemarketing: telephoning householders living along the route of the 
service to ask whether or not they use the service.  Those who already 
did were thanked for doing so and asked their opinions of the service.  
Those who did not use the service were encouraged to do so by the 
provision of free travel tickets to be used within a specific period of 
time.  The non-user group was contacted again a few weeks later to 
ask whether they had used the tickets and if so their opinion of the 
service. 
• A series of television advertisements which achieved a good response 
and which were specifically targeted at the target markets for the 
Kickstart services. 
• Launch events were favoured for completely new services, with 
activities including competitions, distribution of free promotional items 
and press coverage of the event. 
 
One trend which was noted with regard to all projects was the comparative 
lack of marketing and promotion of the services following the initial launch and 
/ or start of the service, although some funding has been obtained within 
some of the later schemes for marketing and promotion campaigns. Very little 
market research has been undertaken to assess the views of users (and non-
users) with regard to the new / enhanced 2005 Kickstart and BRDG services. 
 
5. SCHEME IMPACTS 
 
Here we examine evidence on scheme impacts including: patronage, modal 
shift, social objectives, user benefits, added value, value for public money and 
commercial viability. 
 
5.1 Patronage 
 
The 18 pilot Kickstart schemes are considered first as most have been 
operating for sufficient time to permit some assessment of patronage growth. 
Table 3 compares patronage for the first full year of scheme operation with 
that of the previous year expressed as percentage annual growth for the 
enhanced schemes.  This general rise in patronage compares well to the fall 
in bus patronage of 2.3% in England outside London between 2003/4 and 
2004/5 (Department for Transport, 2005b).  The reference decline in 
patronage represented a continuation of trend over the past 10 years, in the 
face of which arguably any growth in patronage represents success. In at 
least one case performance was adversely affected by long running major 
roadworks impacting on reliability. 
 
Table 3: Percentage Annual Change in Patronage 
Change in patronage Year 1: number of 
services 
Year 2: number of 
services1 
Fall in demand 1 2 
Growth 0% to <10% 4 3 
Growth 10% to <20% 2 2 
Growth 20% to <40% 4 1 
Growth over 40% 1 1 
1 contains some extrapolated part year data 
 
The year one launch period, when changes impacting on journey time, 
opportunities and quality were implemented and marketing activity was most 
intensive, sees the strongest growth with the growth rate nearly halved in year 
two. Nevertheless, two schemes achieved a higher rate of growth in year two 
than in year one.  Overall most of services for which there is some data were 
doing well in achieving strong growth over time. Of the 16 schemes for which 
some information was available 12 have met or exceeded their year one 
patronage target, in some cases dramatically, and six out of eight schemes 
have met or exceeded their year two target.  The growth rates may be 
compared with those of early Quality Bus Partnerships which were 
established in areas where high growth was assumed possible of 5% to 29% 
in the first year of operation (TAS, 2001). 
 
Although the sample size was very small there are some insights to be gained 
from disaggregation: 
 
• Growth rates for urban schemes are approximately twice as high as for 
rural schemes. 
• Schemes with infrastructure investments performed on average twice 
as well as those without, although there are exceptions. 
• Most schemes involved frequency enhancements and those that did 
not were less likely to perform well. 
• Schemes that extended their geographical coverage tend to perform 
less well than those that stuck to their existing operating area.  But 
again there are exceptions. 
 
A limited amount of information was available on the Kickstart 2005 schemes 
and BRDG schemes. Three 2005 Kickstart schemes were on line to exceed 
their first year patronage targets, achieving high growth rates.  Where 
problems have emerged these are largely related to the bid and 
implementation process or external factors such as the implementation of free 
concessionary fares. 
 
For nine BRDG schemes it was possible, albeit on the basis of part year 
operation, to examine patronage. All were achieving some patronage growth 
(in some cases very high rates) and seven were on line to exceed their first 
year target growth rate. 
 
In both cases this was again set against an overall declining market -1.2% 
England outside London and -0.4% Scotland for 2004/5 to 2005/6 
(Department for Transport, 2006c). It seems that promoters of the later 
schemes learnt from the experience of the 2003 Kickstart in avoiding less 
viable schemes. 
 
Clearly changes in patronage are affected by many factors other than these 
specific grant schemes. These include underlying changes in bus use 
occurring anyway, as already discussed, and the impact of local factors, such 
as fares increases or changes to frequencies on other routes that affect the 
attractiveness of the local bus system as a whole, demand management 
measures and road works.  At a national level changes have included: 
 
• Increases in bus operating costs of 7.8% in 2004, 8.2% in 2005 and 
7.1% in 2006 (Confederation of Passenger Transport, 2007), more 
than twice the level of Retail Price Index increases over the same 
period (Office of National Statistics, 2006). With respect to services re-
tendered in 2005, the Association of Transport Coordinating Officers 
(2005) noted average price increases of 8.7% in the English counties, 
11.9% in the unitary authorities and 13.9% in the PTE areas. 
• Bus fares have been increasing above the rate of inflation in England 
outside London and by 2005/6 were 25.4% higher in real terms than in 
1995/6 (Department for Transport, 2006c).   
• The impact of the extension of concessionary fares from half fares to 
zero fares in England has now started to be seen in patronage growth 
outside London (Department for Transport, 2007a). The allocation 
method may leave some authorities with a shortfall in funding which 
could lead to cuts to supported services. 
 
The cost increases in tendered services has put pressure on Local Authority 
budgets for supported services. At a national level the increases in costs have 
not yet been fully reflected in fare increases.  However, there have been 
significant fare increases in some areas and a number of schemes examined 
here have been subject to fare increases of up to 30 to 40% over a year, such 
an increase would be expected to reduce demand by 12 to 16% (all other 
things being equal, assuming a short run demand elasticity of -0.4, Balcombe 
et al, 2004). For many of the enhanced services such effects will be offset by 
increases in frequency which would be expected to grow patronage by 10 to 
40% in the short term using an elasticity to bus miles of +0.4. However, in 
some particularly adverse circumstances even declining patronage may 
represent relative success. 
 
Overall, given that national trends in patronage growth have been negative 
outside London and a range of external factors have also moved in an 
adverse direction the patronage growth achieved by the Kickstart services is 
impressive. 
 
5.2  Modal Shift 
 
Modal shift is a difficult aim set for the Kickstart / BRDG programme, as many 
of the schemes are located in “traditional” bus operating territory with high 
indices of social and economic deprivation and low car ownership, where the 
opportunities and scope for modal shift are limited.  Some modal shift might 
be expected in schemes which operate within commuting corridors where new 
or enhanced bus operation allows modal transfer to a high quality and 
frequent bus service.   
 
Monitoring reports or other information sources based on surveys of 
passengers, and in some cases non-users, were available from a small 
number of authorities and the results are summarised in Table 4. The 
percentages refer to bus users surveyed. 
 
Table 4 Direct and Indirect Modal Shift 
Scheme Survey Direct modal 
shift: % of new 
users 
Indirect modal 
shift % new 
journeys 
Culm Valley 
Connect 
210 on-bus 
interviews and 
603 phone 
interviews 
36% ex car users 9% journeys not 
made before 
Thanet Loop (1) 321 on-bus 
interviews and 70 
household 
interviews 
(2) 803 on-bus 
interviews 
6.2% ex car 
users 
 
 
 
2% ex car users 
4% journeys not 
made before 
27.6% car 
available 
Abingdon-Witney 
Link 
318 on-bus 
interviews 
20% ex car users 56% journeys not 
made before 
St Helens – 
Liverpool John 
Lennon Airport 
Unknown 8% Unknown 
 
Sources: Devon County Council 2006, Babtie Group 2005, Oxford Brookes, 
2005 and Walters 2005 
 
Culm Valley Connect and the Abingdon-Witney link aimed to provide a high 
quality alternative to the car and appear to have succeeded in achieving a 
high level of mode shift from car. Although the report on the Abingdon Witney 
service makes it clear that the greatest shift was from car passenger rather 
than driver. Even services where modal shift was not an aim appear to have 
achieved shifts of 2% to 8%. These figures may be compared with the 
performance of quality bus corridors, where the potential for modal shift is 
probably greatest. The evidence is limited but modal shift between 2% and 
25% has been achieved (Bristow et al, 2002, TAS 2001). More recent 
evidence as Quality Bus Partnerships (QBPs) start to rollout into the less 
attractive corridors suggests a low level of direct modal shift of around 1% 
(Davison and Knowles, 2006). Thus the pilot Kickstart schemes, where some 
monitoring has taken place, appear to be performing as well as or better than 
quality bus corridors. 
 
“Indirect” modal shift is more difficult to identify as change arises not through 
the like for like transfer of a specific journey but through: 
 
“A new willingness to consider bus for new journeys, for example, following a 
change of job or home location 
A tendency for existing bus users to be more satisfied and stay with the bus 
rather than seek an alternative mode.” Bristow et al, 2001 
 
Davison and Knowles (2006) indicate that for recent QBPs around 20% of 
“new” journeys and over 30% in all were “car available”. Again it appears that 
the Kickstart pilots are performing relatively well. 
 
Some of these schemes were intended to serve new housing developments 
and may therefore capture new residents while they are considering their 
options and so reduce levels of car dependency.  By allowing bus services to 
be operated before the critical mass is achieved to justify a commercial 
service (which might never occur if residents are by then captured to car) the 
benefits in terms of reduced car use may be high.  In the context of the scale 
of planned housing developments particularly in the south of England this is a 
critical issue. 
 
Even though the direct modal shift from car to bus may be low  diversion from 
car creates benefits as the externalities of bus use tend to be lower and there 
is usually a decongestion effect.  Department for Transport guidance (2006d) 
provides explicit values for decongestion benefits for the case of rail schemes 
where the value of a car kilometre removed can be as high as £2.00 and as 
low as £0.015 depending on the level of congestion. 
 
Overall, on specific schemes where modal shift was a key objective, the 
limited evidence suggests that the levels of modal shift achieved are as good 
as that achieved by high performing QBP corridors.  Even in less promising 
territory some modal shift has been achieved.  The introduction of effective 
monitoring across schemes could reveal the impacts to be significant.  It is of 
course more difficult to objectively measure indirect modal shift. 
 
5.3 Diverse Social Objectives 
 
Addressing social inclusion objectives through the provision of bus services in 
areas of high social and economic deprivation was not the major determinant 
in the Department for Transports development of the 2003 and 2005 Kickstart 
schemes.  This issue did, however, influence the choice of schemes to be 
worked up into full proposals, as it was anticipated that those schemes which 
“ticked the most inclusion boxes” would be most likely to be funded.  It was 
also recognised that the Kickstart programme allowed the opportunity to 
develop and sustain high quality bus services in areas of multiple deprivation. 
 
In England and Scotland local authorities have taken the opportunity to 
pursue their accessibility agendas by agreeing to target Kickstart and BRDG 
funding into areas of high social and economic exclusion.  Local authorities in 
England have been more likely to provide a pledge to support services at the 
end of the three year Kickstart funding period if the services benefit areas of 
high deprivation. 
 
Despite being the most often stated scheme objective there is little hard 
evidence of a reduction in social exclusion. There is some mention in the 
reports discussed above with respect to those who had no choice of mode or 
other way of making the journey. These include: 
 
• “60% surveyed passengers had no alternative mode of transport before 
the service was introduced” (Devon County Council, 2006); 
• “24.5% of new bus users did not make their journey at all prior to the 
service was introduced” (Walters 2005); 
• “About half of passengers never make use of any other means of 
transport for the journey they were making when surveyed” (Oxford 
Brookes University, 2005); 
• “Over 40% of users would not make their journey without the service” 
(Oxford Brookes University, 2005). 
 
As with measuring modal shift, there was only limited evidence available to 
determine if schemes had successfully met the diverse social objectives they 
had set themselves. 
 
Every scheme from the 2003 Kickstart programme utilised vehicles that would 
allow access to the greatest number of potential passengers – generally low 
floor vehicles. Obviously such an element is very important given the profiles 
of the typical bus user – elderly people, parents with children (and pushchairs) 
and shoppers (with shopping bags) – and this is reflected where data is 
available. Thus, in the Kent example, some 35.6% of existing users and 
17.3% of new users noted that the easy access/low floor aspect was very 
influential in them choosing to use the bus (Walters, 2005). For the 
Oxfordshire service some “one in ten users of the service has difficulty 
walking” (Oxford Brookes University, 2005). 
 
One key way of improving access to facilities is through enhancing frequency. 
Here, Walters (2005) reports that in Kent the high frequency of the new 
service is the “most influential” reason for increased use amongst existing bus 
users. 
 
5.4 Benefits to Existing / New Users 
 
Benefits thus far have been assessed in terms of changes in patronage, in 
line with the key objective of Kickstart / BRDG.  However, there are also 
clearly benefits to existing users.  Even in the absence of information on the 
nature of journeys made in terms of journey purpose, length and timing it was 
possible to speculate in Table 5 on the probable extent of such benefits. 
 
Table 5 Potential User Benefits 
Impact Evidence Value 
Frequency 
enhancement 
Most common service 
enhancement, increases of 25 to 
100% 
£0.79 per 
passenger for a 15 
minute reduction in 
headway on a 4 
mile journey1 
Wait time Frequencies in most cases not 
sufficient to induce random 
arrivals so probably little impact 
2.52 times in-
vehicle time 
In-vehicle time Reductions in running time rare 
under this initiative due to high 
costs of bus priority measures. 
£4.85 per hour3 
Walk time Some services have extended 
geographical coverage, but no 
evidence on reduced walking 
times 
22 times in-vehicle 
time 
Reliability May have an impact but 
dependent on exogenous factors 
1.3 to 24 times in-
vehicle time 
Improved comfort and 
accessibility to vehicles 
Many services are operating new 
vehicles, likely impact 
No consensus 
value 
1derived from Wardman 2004 and Department for Transport, 2006c 
2ratio in Department for Transport 2006e 
3derived from values and occupancy rates in Department for Transport, 2006c 
and 2006e 
4ratios suggested by Bates et al, 2001. 
 
Clearly existing users will benefit from enhanced comfort and accessibility 
from the introduction of new vehicles.  The evidence on values for such 
attributes is limited (Balcombe et al, 2004). 
 
It appears that Kickstart schemes are likely to deliver most benefits to users in 
terms of frequency enhancements and possible reliability gains.  It is therefore 
desirable that monitoring requirements include appropriate monitoring. 
 
5.5 Added Value 
 
Many of the Kickstart and BRDG schemes contain elements of direct added 
value where the operator puts more into the scheme, generally as a result of 
higher than anticipated patronage levels. These include: 
 
• Additional vehicles to provide additional working 
• Frequency increases 
• Extensions to the time period of operation 
• Geographic route extensions 
 
A number of Kickstart schemes included capital funding (50% or higher) for 
the purchase of new vehicles to operate the service.  Kickstart funding has 
been seen as a key part of the annual vehicle replacement programme of 
certain companies. 
 
Some operators and local authorities who have embraced the concept of 
Kickstart have gone on to develop their own ‘Kickstart-style’ schemes. 
Examples of such indirect added value include: 
 
• An unsuccessful bid where the partners went ahead independently 
and implemented key parts of the scheme raising both service quality 
and patronage.  In this case, even though no Kickstart funding was 
given, the partnership working engendered between the operator and 
the local authority in the bid process led to the development of a 
successful Kickstart style scheme. 
• An unsuccessful bid was the subject of a subsequent successful bid 
for City Growth Funding.  
• An operator and local authority took advantage of the partnership 
working developed through Kickstart to revamp a market town service 
in the style of Kickstart – this saw a Monday to Saturday improvement 
in frequency to hourly from three per day. The service is now 
performing very well in terms of patronage and is likely to become fully 
viable.   
 
5.6 Value for Public Money 
 
As some schemes have a range of sources of support and others involve 
capital investment by the operator and any capital investment is usually front-
loaded, it was important to use clearly defined indicators to enable 
comparison on a consistent basis between schemes within and across time 
periods. 
 
Overall, looking only at revenue expenditure the average cost per passenger 
for the pilot Kickstart schemes was £0.93, though the median was only £0.12 
reflecting the skewed distribution.  This is partly due to some 2003 schemes 
being more traditional social schemes rather than truly within the Kickstart 
ethos. Cost per additional passenger was £1.44 (average) and £0.76 
(median).  As these are first year costs they are expected to fall year on year. 
 
A crude calculation based on the total public support for local bus services of 
£2101 million in 2005/6 (including local authority support, concessionary fares 
and BSOG) and total bus journeys of 4719 million (Department for Transport, 
2006c) yields a support per journey figure of £0.44 per journey.  Support per 
journey has increased by over 60% over the past ten years, from a level of 
£0.27 in 1994/5.  The largest increase in payments has been in local authority 
support which in part reflects the recent decline in commercially run mileage.   
Of course the distribution of this support is far from even, whilst all travellers 
benefit from BSOG only those travelling on specific services benefit directly 
from Local Authority support and only those in target groups benefit directly 
from concessionary fares support. 
 
The National Audit Office (NAO) and the Audit Commission (AC) (2005) 
examined Local Authority bus subsidy stating that: 
 
“Local authorities’ subsidy costs per passenger journey on subsidised local 
bus services vary significantly – overall subsidy costs varied between unitary 
authorities, from 50 pence per passenger journey to £3.20, and also between 
counties, from 85 pence per journey to £1.61 – and within authorities subsidy 
costs differ by route, with some routes scarcely requiring subsidy to others 
receiving subsidy of up to £53.34 per journey”. 
 
The costs in terms of Kickstart revenue support per passenger compare well 
with these figures with 12 schemes averaging support at or below £0.50 per 
passenger journey,  four between £1 and £2 and none exceeding £10 in year 
one.  For year two of the schemes for which data is available no scheme 
averages over £1.  With Kickstart capital support added in (and loaded into 
year one rather than smoothed eight schemes average less than £0.50, 
another three were below £1, four lie between £1 and £5, one below £10 and 
the highest was below £25.  Given that the comparison is with continuing 
annual support, whereas the Kickstart support lasts only a maximum of three 
years and should end in commercial viability – the value for money looks 
good. 
 
The benefits of the schemes are difficult to assess as the evidence is limited.  
However, the discussion of frequency benefits in section 5.4 suggests that 
these benefits alone could in some cases offset the costs in terms of revenue 
support. 
 
5.7 Commercial Viability 
 
Each of the 2003 schemes produced a continuation strategy to provide for 
their post-Kickstart future.  In nearly all cases, the 2003 scheme or elements 
of it will survive after the end of Kickstart funding.  It is difficult to generalise 
because of the multiplicity of service types funded under the 2003 
programme; by 2005 the schemes had become very much more homogenous 
as local authorities and bus operators came to understand better the 
principles behind Kickstart.  Based on the consultation undertaken with regard 
to the 2003 schemes: 
 
• one became commercially viable after the first year and is expected to 
remain so 
• six are very likely to become commercial (all or most of scheme) 
• seven are likely to become partly commercial (with some local authority 
support) 
• one is likely to be reformulated and refocused in order to continue 
• the future operation of two schemes was uncertain because of 
uncertainties surrounding the intentions of the bus operator. 
• one only commenced operation in October 2006 
 
The commitment by the local authority to provide support if necessary after 
the funding ends is of key importance to many of the 2003 Kickstart schemes 
in order to ensure their long term viability.  This is particularly the case for the 
more rural of the schemes and for those involving community transport 
operations. 
 
In nearly all cases in Scotland it is anticipated that the BRDG schemes will be 
able to run commercially without a further funding requirement, although it 
appears that at least two schemes will require continuing revenue support. 
 
Revenue growth is the key determinant of commercial viability at the end of 
the Kickstart period of funding.  A number of the 2005 Kickstart schemes in 
England may be compromised in terms of their commercial viability through 
the new free concessionary fares scheme introduced throughout the country 
in April 2006.   
 
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING AND POLICY 
 
Here key findings are placed within a structure that relates to the roles and 
responsibilities of transport policy decision makers, drawing on van de Velde 
(1999). 
  
6.1 Tactical Issues 
 
The first level of tactical issues concerns changes and refinements to improve 
the functioning of Kickstart-type schemes. 
 
The clarity of the bid documentation could be enhanced to ensure the 
provision of data in a common and consistent format that recognises the 
distinction between enhanced and new services.  
 
Longer timescales would allow promoters more time to prepare schemes. It is 
clear that bidders would appreciate feedback, especially on unsuccessful 
bids. 
 
Monitoring requirements need to be clearly specified, but limited to avoid out 
of proportion use of scarce resources. A minimum requirement would be the 
number of passenger trips carried per annum.  As many of the benefits to 
passengers arise from changes to frequency or reliability changes the latter 
should be monitored.  Modal shift should also be monitored through 
independently conducted passenger surveys. 
 
Greater facilitation within the schemes of marketing and promotion measures, 
perhaps through an expectation that funds will be sought for this purpose. 
 
Clearer guidance on state aid and competition rules would be useful in 
offsetting concerns.  A clear and definitive interpretation by Central 
Government would be helpful. 
 
There is a need to ensure the local authority commitments, for example to 
infrastructure funding are equivalent in their binding nature to those made by 
operators.  There is potential in the Quality Bus Partnership model.  
 
Experience thus far indicates that where patronage and revenue have 
exceeded expectations this has led to further enhancements of the service, 
bringing further benefits to passengers and in one case an operator refusing 
further support.  This experience suggests that the inherent flexibility in 
Kickstart is an advantage.   
 
An additional issue is that of “legacy” for the Local Authority.  In the case of 
the earlier “Challenge” schemes this often meant that at the end of the 
specific funding these schemes required continuing support which left 
authorities to choose between these new services and their existing tendered 
services.  The Kickstart / BRDG legacy should be a positive one in terms of 
increased bus use and in some cases the release of funds to support other 
services. This is perhaps the most important feature of Kickstart and a major 
reason for having a successor programme. 
 
6.2 Strategic Issues 
 
Kickstart / BRDG shows potential to be part of a solution to break the vicious 
cycle of patronage decline in the bus industry. 
 
A key success of Kickstart / BRDG to date has been a deepening of existing 
partnership working, the development of new partnerships and innovative 
ways of working.  A key message from the recent proposals for bus services 
in the UK is that of the importance of partnership working (Department for 
Transport, 2006f).   
 
The operation of Kickstart / BRDG in competed markets is constrained by 
concerns with competition law.  Whilst direct on-route competition is 
uncommon, routes will often share sections with those of competitors and this 
may be sufficient to raise doubts.  The type of service the schemes are aimed 
at would not be sufficiently strong commercially to justify conventional 
voluntary Quality Bus Partnership working – but if Kickstart / BRDG were 
applied such partnerships could evolve.  The Draft Transport Bill (Department 
for Transport, 2007b) includes a broadening of the application of the 
competition test (schedule 10) of the Transport Act 2000 to voluntary Quality 
Bus Partnerships.  Multi – operator schemes within Kickstart / BRDG could be 
protected by such coverage. 
 
Kickstart / BRDG support could be targeted to encourage the early 
introduction of bus services into new housing developments. This is an 
opportunity to reduce car dependency and could usefully link into the 
sustainable communities developments.  An exploration of the scope to 
integrate such bus service provision within planning permissions or the S106 
process for new housing developments is indicated. 
 
There is clearly an interest amongst some operators for operator-led schemes 
and this could strengthen the commercial viability. 
 
6.4 Policy Development 
 
Kickstart is one of a variety of policy developments, including an increasing 
use of quality partnerships which may evolve towards a new model for the bus 
industry. A return to the pre-1986 bus industry structure is unlikely with the 
only other extant model being the franchising one used in London. The 
London franchising model does produce significant network benefits and 
passenger growth, but reduces the industry to the role of little more than a 
service contractor and now requires a high level of support.  The issue of 
organisation and regulation has very much been put on the bus policy agenda 
by the 2006 Eddington Report. This notes the continued decline in bus 
services and recommends: 
 
…..that changes to the regulation of the bus market are made, to allow local 
bodies to cooperate more with bus operators; to allow greater coordination 
between bus operators; and to allow local bodies the option of introducing a 
bus franchising model where it can be demonstrated to offer a high value for 
money solution to the transport challenges facing the UK’s urban areas. 
Eddington Report, 2006, para 1.665 
 
Initiatives such as Kickstart could represent the beginnings of a more flexible 
model than franchising - and one that might evolve from the current regulatory 
situation. Building on the developing partnership culture between operators 
and local transport authorities could provide the benefits of system-wide 
planning and long-term development, without the inflexibility of franchising.  If 
built into the Local Transport Plan (LTP) process this could be seen as 
unbalancing the partnership, in that operator initiatives would be less likely to 
come to the fore.  However, if the trade-off was that infrastructure required for 
the success of a Kickstart / BRDG schemes would be implemented, as and 
when planned, the option could look more attractive to operators.  Our feeling 
is that operators would welcome a closer integration with the LTP process in 
terms of releasing and phasing capital funding, but would wish to see 
Kickstart develop as an independent initiative allowing more entrepreneurial 
flair than would be possible if subsumed within the LTP process. 
 
This raises the wider issue of whether, rather than Kickstart being absorbed 
into LTPs, it could form part of a transformation of LTPs into something more 
effective for bus service developments. This could involve bus strategies 
within LTPs being devolved to an entrepreneurial style Kickstart-style 
partnership. This partnership would be between local authorities and / or 
Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs) and operators (and possibly other 
stakeholders, such as user groups) who take responsibility for planning bus 
service developments. This would feed into the LTP process and the 
partnership would also apply for support from future Kickstart or other 
appropriate programmes and funding sources (e.g. hypothecated road use 
charges or Section 106 payments from developers).  
 
Such development would be beyond the current concept of Kickstart, but the 
success of this programme has raised the issue of whether Kickstart has the 
potential to evolve into something that could, in time, produce market 
transformation in the bus industry. 
 
A consideration of policy developments, and the potential for Kickstart to 
evolve into a bus market transformation programme, inevitably raises the 
issue of reform of the overall bus subsidy system.  This issue may be beyond 
our evaluation of the existing Kickstart schemes, but the Eddington Report 
has certainly put this issue on the bus policy agenda. Elements of the existing 
funding mechanisms are becoming increasingly inappropriate, The BSOG 
subsidy is strongly criticised for rewarding mileage regardless of how 
unremunerative that mileage might be in terms of patronage or revenue.  In 
the light of the Stern Review (2006) subsidies that reward energy 
consumption and discourage the adoption of more efficient (but more 
expensive) vehicles cannot be justified in a carbon-constrained world. 
FaberMaunsell (2002) suggested that replacing BSOG with a payment per 
passenger could lead to a 4.7% increase in demand in England outside 
London, with 20 to 40% of these passengers transferring from car.  However, 
the growth in demand would be largely on successful urban routes and 
additional support is likely to be required elsewhere. 
 
The Eddington Report (2006) particularly supports bus service infrastructure 
developments, advocates a partnership approach and ‘focusing on objectives 
and delivering high return schemes.’ A Kickstart-style subsidy mechanism 
may well be more appropriate than the old, albeit entrenched, subsidy 
mechanisms and would be one that could achieve higher patronage growth. It 
was encouraging to see subsidy reform on the agenda as identified in the 
recent policy review (Department for Transport, 2006f)  
 
Overall, the good performance of Kickstart raises some important issues 
about the direction and approach of bus policy in Britain and the forms of 
regulation that might deliver growth. A Kickstart partnership approach can 
deliver growth, with the main questions relating to whether and if so how this 
approach might shift from being the exception to becoming the mainstream.   
 
6.5 Scope for Future Development 
 
Kickstart / BRDG schemes have delivered in terms of scheme performance 
and in the enhancement and development of partnership working between 
operators and local transport authorities.  There is clearly scope for the further 
development of services under these schemes in a number of different 
markets.  These include: 
 
i. The current schemes have largely been targeted at the margins of 
existing networks.  Commercial mileage has declined from a level of 
85% of total bus mileage in England (outside London) and Scotland in 
1996/7 to 78% in England (outside London) and 84% in Scotland in 
2005/6 (Department for Transport, 2006c) with the largest falls 
occurring in the PTE areas.  Thus around 22% of services outside 
London receive direct support additional to BSOG and concessionary 
fares reimbursement (Department for Transport, 2007c). It would not 
therefore be unreasonable to assume 5 to 10% of the total market to 
be “marginal”.  This is in line with the Souter et al, (2004) estimation 
that 10% of Stagecoach routes would be suitable for Kickstart funding. 
ii. Whilst directly competed services are relatively rare, those that are 
contestable or share elements of common running are more prevalent. 
These markets could be targeted through Voluntary Kickstart QBP 
arrangements.  This would allow Kickstart to enter into denser urban 
markets. 
iii. New services may provide better or new links between existing 
attractions and destinations.  Such services are inherently more risky 
than service enhancements and may take longer to build patronage. 
iv. Where new developments are not served by public transport from the 
beginning, the habit of car dependency is unlikely to be cut.  Individuals 
are more likely to change their travel behaviour when changing home 
or job locations. New developments give easy access to people who 
are by definition changing their journey origins and / or destinations.  
Commercial operators are unlikely to enter such markets until a critical 
mass of population is attained at which stage it is likely to be too late as 
car dependent patterns will have emerged. Kickstart gives a critical 
opportunity to support the early entry of services into new 
developments to provide travel choices from the beginning.  Given the 
scale of new housing developments planned, especially in the South 
East of England, this type of market could be specifically targeted. 
v. The introduction of local road user charging will clearly require 
enhanced public transport provision (Department for Transport, 2006f).  
The incentive to build patronage within the Kickstart / BRDG schemes 
clearly has a role to play in such contexts. 
vi. Rural schemes tend to grow more slowly than those implemented in 
urban areas. With low population densities and dispersed destinations 
some will not become fully commercial.  Nevertheless, rural schemes 
can deliver increased patronage and modal shift thus reducing the level 
of subsidy required in the longer run. 
vii. There may also be scope to extend the principles of Kickstart to 
community transport and social enterprise schemes where the focus is 
on growing the market and increasing the viability of such schemes. 
 
A conservative estimate might suggest a doubling of the budget to date in 
England, to around £56 million for the next Kickstart round and a more 
gradual increase in Scotland (where the budget per head of population and 
relative to existing support budgets is considerably higher than in England).  
Targeting on particular markets might help to reveal where the best results 
are to be gained. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The evidence suggests that Kickstart / BRDG schemes have been successful 
in several areas. Patronage growth has occurred on marginal or new services 
in the context of an overall declining market. There is some evidence of modal 
shift at a level comparable with Quality Bus Partnership achievements on key 
corridor schemes.  Modest modal shift has been achieved in less promising 
territory. Existing users have benefited from both frequency enhancements 
and the provision of more accessible vehicles. 
 
The schemes appear to have stimulated genuine partnership working 
whereby operators consider social needs and local authorities take account of 
commercial requirements in both cases leading to greater understanding. This 
has further encouraged entrepreneurial flair in local authority thinking. The 
schemes are expected to leave a positive legacy of enhanced services, 
reflected in the desire of both operators and local authorities to see the 
schemes continue. 
 
The schemes have delivered added value through: the delivery of further 
service enhancements over and above those specified in the bids as 
patronage grows; stimulating the development of Kickstart style schemes by 
local authorities in cooperation with operators and the levering of additional 
investment / support from bus operators and others. 
 
It appears that this form of support may offer a better return than subsidy that 
supports the status quo or indeed patronage based support. On the whole the 
supported services appear to be on-line to reduce the requirement for 
revenue support by lifting marginal services into commercial performance, 
and releasing revenue for support to other services. 
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Figure 1: Location of Kickstart and BRDG Schemes 
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Annex 1 
 
List of awarded schemes: including name, Council, and Operator.  Arranged 
in alphabetical order by Council. 
 
Kickstart 2003 
A51, Cheshire County Council, Arriva. 
Trevithick Urban Link, Cornwall County Council, Truronian. 
Route 51, Derbyshire County Council, Stagecoach. 
Culm Valley Connect, Devon County Council, Stagecoach. 
Westham & Pevensey, East Sussex County Council, Eastbourne Buses. 
Hastings Community Transport, Hastings Dial a Ride. 
Thanet Links, Kent County Council, Stagecoach East Kent. 
Gravesend, Kent County Council, Arriva. 
Preston Orbital, Lancashire County Council, Preston Buses. 
Service 54, Leicester City Council, First. 
John Lennon Airport Link, Merseytravel, Arriva NW. 
Contemporary Service for a Modern Lifestyle, North Somerset Council, First. 
Nailsea and District Community Transport, North Somerset County Council. 
Abingdon – Witney Bus link, Oxfordshire County Council, Thames Travel. 
Plymouth Travel to Work Area, Plymouth City Council, First. 
Extending the rural bus network, Rutland County Council, Kimes Coaches. 
Gateshead Cross Link, Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport Executive, Go 
North East. 
West Keighley Local Links, West Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive, 
Keighley & District. 
 
Kickstart 2005 
Cambridge Sustainable Transport 2020 Vision - Phase 1, Cambridgeshire 
County Council, Stagecoach Cambridge. 
Northwich - Winsford - Leighton Hospital – Crewe, Cheshire County Council, 
Arriva. 
Camborne/Pool/Redruth (CPR)- Falmouth Bus Corridor, Cornwall County 
Council, First Devon and Cornwall. 
Route 39, Derbyshire County Council, Stagecoach. 
Exeter City Select, Devon County Council, Stagecoach Devon. 
Tavy Goldline, Devon County Council, First. 
Jaywick to Clacton Town Centre, Essex County Council, Hedingham 
Omnibuses. 
Canvey Island to Chelmsford, Essex County Council, Regal Busways. 
Gloucestershire Route D, Gloucestershire County Council, Stagecoach West. 
Improvements to 378 Stockport-Bramhall-Cheadle Hulme Service, Greater 
Manchester Passenger Transport Executive, Stagecoach. 
New express service from Leigh to Manchester (X34), Greater Manchester 
Passenger Transport Executive, First Manchester. 
Service 263 Improvement, Greater Manchester Passenger Transport 
Executive, Arriva North West. 
Enhanced Service 61 Widnes to Farnworth, Halton Borough Council, Halton 
Borough Transport Limited. 
Blackwater Valley Route 3, Hampshire County Council, Stagecoach South. 
Sittingbourne Kickstart Project, Kent County Council, Arriva Southern 
Counties. 
Dover and Deal Diamond, Kent County Council, Stagecoach in East Kent. 
Chorley Connect, Lancashire County Council, Stagecoach North West. 
General Hospital Bus Link, Leicester City Council, First. 
Nottingham East Midlands Airport Bus Strategy, Leicestershire County 
Council, Kinch Bus / Arriva. 
Connecting Gainsborough, Lincolnshire County Council, Lincolnshire Road 
Car. 
Regenerating Gainsborough, Lincolnshire County Council, Lincolnshire Road 
Car. 
Service 176 cross-town upgrade, Medway Council, Arriva Southern Counties. 
Reinvigorating the Grimsby and Cleethorpes Bus Network, North East 
Lincolnshire Council, Stagecoach Grimsby Cleethorpes. 
Service 40 Easingwold to York, North Yorkshire County Council, Reliance 
Motor Services. 
Plus 518, Northumberland County Council, Arriva North East, £294,776. 
Evening service for route X40, RAF Benson - Wallingford – Reading, 
Oxfordshire County Council, Thames Travel (Wallingford) Ltd. 
Local Link Plus, Peterborough City Council, Peterborough City Council 
(Contract Services). 
Service 81 Enhancement, Redcar and Cleveland Council, Arriva North East. 
U1 The Intermodal air-coach-ferry-rail link, Southampton Council, Minerva 
Accord. 
Better Buses between Barnsley and Penistone, South Yorkshire Passenger 
Transport Executive, The Yorkshire Traction Company Ltd. 
MIBus, Stockton-on-Tees Council, Arriva North East. 
Service 55 Blakenham Park to Ipswich, Suffolk County Council, Ipswich 
Buses. 
Services 4/5, Surrey County Council, Stagecoach. 
South Devon College and Western Corridor Scheme, Torbay Council, 
Stagecoach. 
X47 Kingston Park Express, Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport Executive, 
Stagecoach North East. 
135/136 Cross-Wear Service, Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport 
Executive, Go North East. 
Gateshead Orbital, Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport Executive, Go North 
East. 
Service 767 - Tamworth - Kingsbury - Coleshill and Interchange rail station - 
BIA/NEC, Warwickshire County Council, Arriva Midlands. 
Worthing Direct, West Sussex County Council, Stagecoach. 
Orange Line To Morrisons, West Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive, 
First (West Yorkshire) Ltd. 
Holme Valley RailLink, West Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive, First 
(West Yorkshire) Ltd. 
Bus 55 Service Improvements, Wiltshire County Council, Stagecoach West. 
Making the Connection, Worcestershire County Council, First. 
 
Bus Route Development Grant March 2005 
Services 101/106/107: Stonehaven Corridor (A90 South / A92) Aberdeen - 
Stonehaven – Montrose, Aberdeenshire Council, Stagecoach. 
Forfar Town Local Services, Angus Council, Strathtay Scottish Ltd. 
Route 49, City of Edinburgh, Lothian Buses. 
Route 35, City of Edinburgh, Lothian Buses. 
Route 24, City of Edinburgh, Lothian Buses. 
Route 30, City of Edinburgh, Lothian Buses. 
Route 17, City of Edinburgh, Lothian Buses. 
Route X37, City of Edinburgh and Midlothian Council, Lothian Buses. 
Cross City Direct, Dundee City Council, Strathtay. 
Dunbar – Edinburgh corridor improvements, East Lothian Council, First. 
Services 10/11/12 enhancement and extension of Falkirk circle routes, Falkirk 
Council, First. 
Service 37/39/X1 Kirkcaldy – Glenrothes, Fife Council, Stagecoach. 
Service 5/6 Inverness City (Hilton/Milton/Inshes), Highland Council, 
Stagecoach. 
Service 25X Inverness – Dornoch, Highland Council, Stagecoach 
Service 26 Inverness – Cromarty, Highland Council, Rapsons. 
Service 31, Midlothian Council, Lothian Buses. 
Service 10 enhancement of Inverness – Elgin route, Moray Council, 
Stagecoach Bluebird. 
Services 5/6 and 9/10 enhancement of Muirton and North Muirton, Perth and 
Kinross Council, Stagecoach. 
Service 62 Galashiels to Edinburgh via Peebles, Scottish Borders Council, 
First. 
Services 95/X95 Hawick – Edinburgh via A7 corridor, Scottish borders 
Council, First. 
Services 29/30 Jedburgh – Edinburgh via A68 corridor, Scottish Borders 
Council, Munro’s of Jedburgh. 
New Glasgow night services, Strathclyde Passenger Transport Executive, 
First 
New Glasgow – Eaglesham night service, Strathclyde Passenger Transport 
Executive, First. 
Service 3 extension to Townhead, Strathclyde Passenger Transport 
Executive, First. 
Service 38 extension from Garthamlock – Gartcosh Industrial Park, 
Strathclyde Passenger Transport Executive, First. 
New limited stop service through Ayr – Kilmarnock – East Kilbride – Hamilton, 
Strathclyde Passenger Transport Executive, Stagecoach. 
Blackridge to Livingston corridor, West Lothian Council, Davidson Buses. 
 
Bus Route Development Grant November 2005 
Aberdeen Route 5, Aberdeen City, First Aberdeen 
Kirriemuir – Forfar local bus service, Angus Council, Strathtay Scottish Ltd,  
Service enhancement between Oban and Dunbeg, Argyll and Bute, West 
Coast Motors. 
Dumfries Town Services, Dumfries and Galloway Council, Stagecoach 
Inverkeithing railway station to Edinburgh Airport, Fife Council, Stagecoach. 
Service 99 St Andrews to Dundee Corridor, Fife Council, Stagecoach. 
Service 78 Dunfermline to High Valleyfield, Fife Council, Stagecoach. 
Enhancement of Services 1, 1a and 1b in Kirkwall to Stromness corridor, 
Orkney Islands Council, Rapsons. 
The North Isles Integrated Bus Project, Shetland Islands Council, Zetland 
Transport Partnership. 
 
